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A FICKLE FORMULATION
U.S. plays nursemaid to the marketplace
Colleen A. Brown
I. GLOBAL CONCERN WITH "BABY-BOTTLE
SYNDROME" LEADS TO THE WHO CODE
On May 21, 1981, the United States was the only nation in
the 125-member World Health Organization (WHO) to
cast a vote against the adoption of the International Code
of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (the Code). The
U.S. government had long been involved in the process of
developing the Code and had led the Assembly to believe
that it fully endorsed the movement to prohibit marketing
practices which caused "baby-bottle syndrome, ' a serious
type of malnutrition associated with improper use of infant
formula. But on May 16 the United States announced its
intention to vote against the Code. By then it was too late
-for WHO to undo the last-minute concessions the U.S. had
secured as a condition of its support. Besides destroying the
human rights program cultivated by Jimmy Carter, the new
administration was sending an explicit message to the inter-
national corporate community: your interests are our in-
terests. Additionally, this action illustrated the U.S.
government's tacit support of the marketing of infant for-
mula, regardless of the consequences to the health and lives
of the children who subsist on this food.
The marketing of infant formula to poor, uneducated
women follows the same pattern as the marketing of other
types of "First World" products in "Third World" environ-
ments. The growing populations of the underdeveloped
nations have been seen as new, large clienteles for trans-
national food conglomerates. The difficulties of marketing
modern technology in these countries are numerous and
complex. The use of promotional techniques which instill a
belief that infant formula is better than breastmilk has led to
the devastation of an alarming number of infants through
malnutrition.
The typical sequence of events leading a rural, unedu-
cated woman to "choose" to bottle feed her infant is as fol-
lows: She may have noticed signs and posters advertising
infant formula which depict a loving and well-to-do woman
bottle feeding a very healthy-looking child. Since she has
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always seen members of her community and family breast-
fed she may become somewhat confused. Yet she also
knows that many of the children born around her die before
reaching their first birthday. When she goes to the com-
munity clinic to give birth to her next child she sees more
bottle-feeding publicity. After the child is born, a woman
dressed in a white uniform comes into her room with a baby
bottle filled with formula. The woman explains how to use
the bottle and reassures her that mothers in the modern
countries feed their babies formula and virtually all of those
children grow up to live long, healthy lives. The woman
tries feeding the formula to her child and discovers that he
likes it. When she leaves the hospital, the nice woman in
the white uniform gives her some free formula.
It is only when the free formula is gone and she has to
buy the formula herself that she realizes that it is extremely
expensive. If the mother has bottle-fed exclusively for more
than three days, she is probably no longer lactating and,
thus, has no alternative to the formula. The economical,
concerned mother "stretches" the formula by diluting it.
No one has told her that the water must be sterile or the
bottle clean. She may have no access to clean water. Some
mothers believe that it is the bottle, not its contents, that
brings health to the child and, thus, just fill the bottle with
(dirty) water or with the gruel the rest of the family eats.
The diluted, contaminated formula causes the child to have
severe diarrhea.
Due to the absence of proper medical attention,
thousands of infants die each year of malnutrition con-
tracted in this way. The appalling irony of it all is that the
mothers do not understand why their children have died.
They have done just as they were told. Mothers have been
known to place packages of infant formula upon'their chil-
dren's graves to let the world know that the child died de-
spite their best efforts to nourish him in the modem way.
Thousands of women have become "hooked" on breast-
milk substitutes in this way. The hospitals have brought so
many new ways of helping and saving children to these
poor communities that the women would not consider
questioning a product promoted by hospital personnel. (It
was not until very recently that these "milk nurses" were
required to identify themselves as being employees of the
formula industry and not of the clinic.)
When government experts on infant nutrition began to
notice the sudden and steep increase in formula use along,
side a continually rising rate of infant morbidity and mortal-
ity, some studies were begun. The studies culminated in a
UNICEF-WHO conference held in Bogota, Colombia, in
1970.
A follow-up meeting was held in 1972 under the aus-
pices of the Protein Advisory Group (PAG) of the United
Nations. It was here that a statement was drafted setting
forth the belief that continued promotion of infant formula
in the Third World threatened infant health.
In 1974, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the gov-
erning body of WHO, unanimously adopted a resolution
which blamed misleading marketing practices for the
precipitous decline in breastfeeding. This decline was iden-
tified as being directly related to the rise in infant malnutri-
tion and death.
The United States' direct and continuing involvement
in the controversy was highlighted in 1978 when the U.S.
Senate held hearings on the marketing practices of the in-
fant formula industry, chaired by Senator Edward Ken-
nedy. Experts from pediatric, obstetric, public health,
corporate policy, and industry groups were heard. As a
result of the hearings, Senator Kennedy requested the
Director-General of WHO to convene an international con-
ference where all concerned parties could discuss what
could be done to eliminate infant malnutrition related to the
use of breastmilk substitutes.
At the October 1979 WHO conference, the partici
pants decided to draw up an international code of conduct
for the industry, a code that would be general enough to
stand a reasonable chance of being adhered to by the manu-
facturers and be strong enough to reduce the malnutrition
problem.
If adopted as a regulation, the Code would be regis-
tered with the U.N. Secretariat in accordance with Article
102 of the U.N. Charter as an international agreement and
would be binding by law. However, if the Code were
adopted as a recommendation, as indeed it was, it would
not be legally binding on the member states, per se. A
recommendation can become binding only if the member
state chooses to make it so by giving effect to it within the
nation's legal framework-that is, by enacting statutes.
Even without this action, the WHA views its recommen,
dations as carrying some moral/political weight, in that
they constitute the judgment of the collective membership
of the organization.
The Code was adopted as a recommendation in order
to maintain as wide a base of support as possible. As a
recommendation, the Code sets forth what WHO believes
each member state should do. It is then up to each nation to
decide to what extent, if any, it will enact legislation to at-
tain the goals of the Code.
The Code's provisions concentrate on the problem of
how formula advertising leads to a decline in breastfeeding.
Yet the Code is not worded very strongly. For example, the
aim of the Code (Article 1) is:





to contribute to the provision of safe and adequate
nutrition for infants, by the protection and promotion
of breastfeeding, and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes....
Regrettably, the Code concentrates on the intent of manu-
facturers; whereas human rights activists are more con-
cerned with the effects.
It is apparent from the facts that the Code was not
directly aimed at forcing the industry out of Third World
markets. Nevertheless, it was meant to underscore the nec-
essity of breastfeeding to good infant nutrition and to signal
to the manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes that nations
would now begin to enact statutes to limit marketing prac-
tices that health experts believed were responsible for
"baby-bottle syndrome"; a unanimous international state-
ment, even if not threateningly strong, provides a very im-
portant standard.
II. ARRIVAL OF A NEW AMERICAN
PRESIDENT
On* May 15, 1981, it was announced that the United
States government intended to vote against the Code. The
confusion this announcement generated indicated that U.S.
officials in Geneva had either been deceiving foreign diplo-
mats or that there had been a communications breakdown
with the White House, as the new U.S. position was total-
ly inconsistent with all previous American indications and
actions-even under the new president.
It was soon revealed that the White House had chosen
to act unilaterally for its own political reasons. The new
U.S. position was contrary to all informed advice from the
experts who had been delegated to amass information on
the use of formula. President Reagan was willing to suffer a
loss of respect from experts in Geneva, international health
organizations, and even his own Congress in order to dem-
onstrate his unequivocal alignment with (American) big
business. His priorities have always been apparent, but in
this case Reagan's steadfast adherence to those priorities
was carried out in a diplomatically sloppy way, which
caused political turmoil both within his administration and
between the U.S. government and its allies.
To fully appreciate the great contradiction in policy
manifested by the May 15 decision, it is necessary to exam-
ine it in the context of the actions of the U.S. government
subsequent to its introduction to WHO by Senator Ken-
nedy in early 1979. It is clear that a conscious decision was
made early on to demonstrate a strong U.S. commitment to
the spirit of the WHO efforts to reduce "commerciogenic"
infant malnutrition. Once the work on the Code was under-
way, groups such as the Infant Formula Action Coalition
(INFACT), the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsi-
bility (ICCR), the National Women's Health Network, and
Infant Formula Manufacturers' lobbyists launched into a
very active information campaign in the United States.
Interestingly, these efforts do not seem to have been
discouraged by the arrival of a new, conservative president.
In fact, more hearings were held in Congress and an Inter-
agency Task Force of experts began to investigate the im-
pact of the industry's marketing tactics shortly after Rea-
gan's inauguration. At the close of the hearings and at the
termination of the Task Force's search, these groups ad-
vised the White House that the United States should cast
its vote in favor of the Code.
As late as April 9, 1981, Dr. John Bryant, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Health under Presi-
dent Reagan, submitted a memorandum on "Studies of
Relationships Between Use of and/or Marketing of Infant
Formula and Breast Feeding" to the members of the Inter-
agency Task Force on Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes.
Dr. Bryant is employed by the Department of Health and
Human Services, undoubtedly the single most influential
department in the U.S. government on any question, of in-
fant health and nutrition. In this memorandum, Dr. Bryant
summarized the content and conclusions of three major
studies of the issue.
The first study indicated that (Canadian) women who
received infant formula at the time of discharge from the
hospital were "more likely to terminate breast feeding early
and more likely to add solid foods within the first eight
weeks." Dr. Bryant noted that the difference between the
two groups studied were even more pronounced when the
women were less educated or ill. He explicitly pointed out
that this study "appears to contradict the industry's posi-
tion that there are no scientific studies that show a cause-
and-effect relationship between marketing practices and
declines in breastfeeding."
The second study concerned Papua New Guinea legis-
lation, which banned the advertising of milk for bottle-
feeding and imposed requirements that feeding bottles,
teats, and dummies be available only with a prescription
from an authorized health worker. The law also mandated
that health workers give instructions on the proper propor-
tions needed to prepare the milk and on the hygienic meas-
ures necessary for safe feeding.
Dr. Bryant found that this New Guinea legislation had
a major impact in promoting breastfeeding and in diminish-
ing morbidity and mortality rates due to gastroenteritis
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associated with bottle-feeding. His report noted that:
[pjrior to this legislation, in 1975 and 1976, a survey
of Post Moreby showed that one-third of the chil-
dren under two had been artificially fed and that 69
percent of the artificially fed children were malnour-
ished (weight-for-age less than 80 percent of the
standard) compared with 26 percent of breastfed
children.
In 1979, twenty months after the legislation, the
proportion of breastfeeding had increased to 88 per-
cent with a reduction in malnutrition. There has also
been a marked decrease in the number of infants
under six months admitted to the hospital with gas-
troenteritis, together with a similar decline in deaths
from gastroenteritis associated with bottle-feeding.
The third study was one designed to ascertain the
reasons for the decline in breastfeeding in the low-income
population of Brazil. The findings of this research project in-
cluded the following: (1) of infants admitted to the hospital,
95 percent had been weaned and only 5 percent exclusively
breastfed through the sixth month; (2) 81.8 percent of the
doctors serving these populations believed that free distri-
butibn of milk might have been contributing to the reduc-
tion of the breastfeeding period, but all regarded such dis-
tribution as essential; (3) only 6 percent of the mothers
interviewed received information on breastfeeding at the
maternity clinics; (4) between 1974 and 1979, advertising
expenditures for the marketing of milk in Brazil, using
the mass media, exceeded that for all other categories of
food and was surpassed only by cigarettes and soap, the
outlays rising elevenfold from 1974 ($151,000) to 1979
($1,637,000).
Dr. Bryant was convinced that the "Brazil study asso-
ciated the very high rates of bottlefeeding and infant
malnutrition with a combination of factors, including adver-
tising of milk products through the mass media and the role
of health professionals, presumably influenced by the in-
dustry, who discourage women from breastfeeding."
Other high-ranking Administration officials under Mr.
Reagan also investigated the question and became con-
vinced that the United States ought to endorse the Code.
Early in 1981 the Department of'Justice informed the direc-
tor of WHO Legal Division, Claude-Henri Vignes, that:
... If the U.S. producers were to adhere to the Code
on a unilateral basis [as opposed to some manufactur-
ers joining together to agree on restraints that have
adverse competitive effects), or if the Code were to
be adopted under U.S. law, there would be no concern
under the U.S. anti-trust law. [fmphasis added)
The Code recommends that each government take respon-
sibility for ensuring that manufacturers take the necessary
action to meet the goals of the Code without violating na-
tional law and that each country adopt the Code within its
own legal framework (Article XI).
In the end, the Reagan White House chose to ignore
the findings and advice of its own Interagency Task Force
and to base its actions on grounds that were wholly incon,
sistent with the statement issued by its own Justice
Department officials. The rationale given by the White
House to explain the anti-Code vote was not persuasive.
The press release indicated that the United States could
not support international regulation of business-a kind of
regulation that was not needed and would not be imposed
in the United States-and further that interference with
advertising and marketing of infant formula was in violation
of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the
U.S. anti-trust laws. (Congress, after holding hearings on
these specific questions, which included testimony from the
respected D.C. attorney, Stewart Pierson, had come to the
opposite conclusion.)
Internal State Department memoranda (which were
made available to Jack Anderson and to INFACT) reveal
that in March of 1981 the Administration began to
perceive the serious political ramifications of a "no" vote. It
was then that Secretary Haig sent a cable to all U.S. embas,
sies in industrial countries outlining the possible U.S. op-
tions in order to offset the possibility that a vote against the
code would isolate the United States from the international
community and jeopardize American foreign policy objec- -
tives.
[Even) in the form of a recommendation, the Code
contains certain problems for the U.S. Government
and particularly for U.S. industry.... From the in-
dustry point of view, the Code also recommends
against a number of current marketing practices that
industry believes have no effect on trends in breast.
feeding and/or are valuable to public health interests.
Even if the U.S. Government made a statement say
ing it had no intention of adopting laws or regulations
to implement certain provisions because they are in-
applicable in the U.S. or of debatable validity in the
current controversy, companies feel they would
nevertheless be under severe moral pressure to con-
form to these provisions.... There is a possibility
that this Code could set a precedent for other Codes
relating to other aspects of international business,
and we wish this Code brought to the attention of




The shift in the United States' position reflects the inti-
mate relationship between big business and the White
House. In late April 1981 the State Department sent Elliot
Abrams (then the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Organizations-now the Assistant Secretary of
State for the Human Rights Division!) to Geneva to per-
suade Halfdan Mahler, WHO Director-General, to alter
the Code so that it would be more acceptable to the United
States. The two concessions requested (and later granted)
were (1) the Code would be defined as strictly voluntary
and (2) it would be applicable to infant formula only-not to
any other baby food. According to Jack Anderson's report
of this mission, Abrams had been instructed by Deputy
Secretary of State William Clark (who was acting Secretary
of State in Alexander Haig's absence, now National Securi-
ty Advisor) that if these two concessions were granted the
United States would abstain instead of voting against the
Code.
State Department cables indicated that the Abrams
conference with Mahler had produced positive results and
that Mahler was "visibly relieved" to hear of the United
Statee intention not to vote against the Code. The situation
was not at all as it appeared, however. This fragile negotia-
tion" conceded by WHO was to be undermined by Ed
Meese. Clark had apparently failed to clear the U.S. posi-
tion with the President's chief counselor.
It is reported that on May 1 Ed Meese, Richard Allen,
Lyn Nofziger, and Martin Anderson met to discuss the
situation at the WHO assembly. They reached the conclu,
sion "that the United States should cast a negative vote on
the Code," regardless of whether the two conditions nego-
tiated by Abrams had been met. These advisors perceived
the concerns of Bristol-Myers, Abbott Laboratories, Amer-
ican Home Products (the three U.S. manufacturers/market-
ers of infant formula), and Grocery Manufacturers of
America (represented by former Senator Sam Ervin) to be
more compelling than the diplomatic/political commitments
pending in Geneva-to say nothing of the human rights con-
cerns of infants and mothers around the world.
These businesses had long urged that the Code's adop-
tion would give ammunition to the critics of big business,
whereas a U.S. rejection would discredit the Code. More-
over, they claimed that the Code's adoption would set a
precedent which might lead to action in other fields like
pharmaceuticals. Nor was it a small consideration that in-
fant formula represented a $7 billion international market
that was increasing by 20 percent annually.
When it first became apparent that the United States
might not vote in favor of the Code, one human rights advo-
cate commented that!
The U.S. companies have asked the Administration
to go further [than just suspending consumer protec-
tion from industry): to protect industry from con-
sumers.
The definitive response to the industry's plea for protection
was given in our bold vote of May 21.
One of the most striking reactions to the U.S. vote was
the resignation of two outstanding members of the Ameri-
can delegation to the WHA: Stephen Joseph, M.D., a
pediatrician and the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment's (AID) highest ranking medical professional; and
Eugene Babb, deputy assistant Administrator for the food
and nutrition department of AID. They resigned in protest
against the vote and to reiterate the view that the Reagan
Administration was acting in total disregard of human
rights and of the advice of American officials who had the
expertise to decide such issues.
Dr. Joseph aired his disgust in a statement to the press
on May 18, 1981.
The United States has rightfully earned a high degree
of credibility in the World Health Organization. We
are now about to throw away that credibility and to
isolate ourselves and to do this needlessly. There is
no significant principle here of protection of national
sovereignty or free speech. There is no major national
economic or political interest to be gained. These are
shallow and specious arguments, seeking to create ad-
versaries that do not exist, in an international forum
where we have been welcome and even honored
members. The major emotion among our partners in
health was not hostility but sadness-regret that the
United States could adopt so base a position.
I want to send a clear message to our colleagues
throughout the world that health professionals in this
free society stand against the position being pro-
posed. I am calling on all health professionals and all
those with a concern for child health and develop-
ment to make their voices forcefully heard, to seek
the same access and responsiveness at the White
House that a small vested-interest group [the formula
manufacturers) has gained. Make yourself heard, and
do it now, before our country disgraces itself this
week in the World Health Assembly.
III. MOST SIGNIFICANT RAMIFICATIONS:
DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO IMPLEMENT
THE CODE IN THE UNITED STATES
In addition to the international repercussions the United
States may suffer as a result of the negotiations and the
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final vote, the policy position we took against the code en-
tails some impressive political gambles at home. The pres-
sure to actually implement the recommendations may be
stronger now than it would have been had the United
States quietly voted "yes."
The Reagan Administration, with this action in Gene-
va, seriously undermined any policy to promote human
rights as an ultimate American priority. The message that
Mr. Reagan transmitted on May 15, 1981, was unmistaka-
ble: we think infant nutrition is important; it's heartbreak-
ing that women are being misled by formula overpromotion,
but we cannot let Third World ignorance and backward-
ness justify an interference with the rising profits of the
enterprising companies.
That sounds dreadfully close to saying that human
rights are only defensible when their defense doesn't hurt
big business. Interestingly, this latter statement is not en-
tirely inconsistent with other "human rights" positions
taken to date by this administration. Consider the appoint-
ment of Ernest LeFevre to the post of Secretary of the
Human Rights Division (which was unsuccessful, in part,
because of the publicity of Mr. LeFevre's "'Nestle's Con-
nection"), increased military and food aid to right-wing
repressive regimes, and an economic policy that slashes
food stamps, welfare, medicaid, and school lunch programs
in order to increase defense spending and continue sub-
sidies for oil and tobacco producers.
This administration may be in error in concluding that
health officials and human rights activists, like the poor,
have little political clout. There was broad-based support
and involvement in the formula controversy during the
Senate hearings, and the Nestle's boycott in this country
has already grown powerful enough to alter the Swiss cor-
poration's advertising schemes. Had it not been for the fact
that the regrettable human rights decision took place at a
time when Reagan was still popular and still unveiling new
socio-economic programs, the vote against the Code might
have attracted the media attention necessary for the public
backlash this action deserved. But the abgnce of a true
public backlash does not signal apathy or surrender.
Three weeks after the vote, on June 16, 1981, hearings
were held (before the Subcommittee on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade and the Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organizations, of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs) to reconsider the WHO vote
cast by the United States. It was on this same day that the
House of Representatives passed H.J. Resolution 287 (by a
vote of 301 in favor to 100 against), wherein the Congress
(1) expressed its dismay at the negative vote cast by
DRMULATION
the United States on May 21, 1981 ... ;
(2) urged the Administration to promptly notify
the W.H.O. that the U.S. government would
filly cooperate with other nations in the imple.
mentation of the Code;
(3) urged the United States infant formula industry
to abide by the guidelines of that code, particular
ly with respect to exports and the activities of
subsidiaries in developing countries; and
(4) reaffirm the dedication of the United States to
the protection cf all of the world's children and
the support of the United States for efforts to im-
prove world health.
On June 17, 1981, hearings were held (before the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigation of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce) to learn more about
the domestic infant formula industry.
And, on June 18, the U.S. Senate adopted Section 118
of the Department of State Authorization Act, as amend-
ment 72 (by a vote of 89 in favor and 2 against). Yet, after
quoting much of the language of H.R. 287, noting the supe-
riority of breastmilk and the rising concern over improper
use of breastmilk substitutes, the last three sentences pro-
vide a disappointing shift of focus:
(2) endorses the work being done by the Agency for
International Development (AID), WHO, and
UNICEF across the broad front of problems asso-
ciated with infant and young child nutrition;
(3) encourages the international health organizations,
and their member-states, to continue combatting
infant illness by improving sanitation and water
quality; and
(4) urges the United States government and breast-
- Milk substitutes industry to support the basic aim
of the Code and to cooperate with the govern
ments of all countries in their efforts to develop
health standards and programs designed to imple-
ment the objectives of the Code.
The Senate appears to endorse the goals of the Code.
-What remains at issue is the means. The United States will
not commit itself to the attainment of these goals when the
method of eliminating the problem is not improvement of
sanitation but rather prohibition of overpromotion. The
U.S. government will not concede that the malnutrition in
question is "commerciogenic." It is not the aim of the Code
to modernize all nations of the world such that breastmilk
substitutes can be used more safely, for that is neither pos-
sible nor desirable. The aim of the Code is to give infants
the best nourishment available-breastmilk-and to con-
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demn the actions of any person or organization who inter-
feres with this aim.
The most direct mandate of the Code is to forbid multi-
national food manufacturers from entering markets where
the population has a high likelihood of misusing the product
and using sales techniques aimed at creating a belief that
their product is needed. Breastmilk manufacturers operating
in poor, rural ghettos are not catering to an actual need.
They are trying to create a need from which they will prof-
it, with little regard for the added "price" consumers pay in
infant disease and mortality.
IV. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CODE
True, the United States would have shown compassion for
all of the world's children by voting for the Code, but it
would have also been committed to the enactment of na-
tional legislation to regulate marketing practices of U.S. for-
mula manufacturers within the United States. What remains
understated is that problems such as the lack of resources
necessary for the proper preparation of formula, the inabili-
ty to read instructions, and the alarmingly high rates of
fatal infant malnutrition which were cited by Congress as
present in "a variety of developed and developing nations,"
are also affecting the users of formula in this country. The
domestic problem dictates that a concerned effort to fight
growing commerciogenic malnutrition is necessary.
The Public Advocates law firm has found the domestic
problem so compelling that they have filed an administra-
tive rule-making petition, which pits the National League of
United Latin American Citizens, INFACT, National
Council of Negro Women, National Women's Health Net-
work, Women of All Red Nations, Mexican-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Coalition to Fight In-
fant Mortality, American Public Health Association,
Women's Dance Health Group, National Council of Jewish
Women, National Association of Parents and Professionals
for Safe Alternatives in Childbirth, ICCR, and Interna-
tional Childbirth Education Association against HHS Sec-
retary Richard S. Schweiker, FDA Administrator Arthur
H. Hayes, Defense Department Secretary Caspar Wein-
berger, Defense Department Assistant Secretary for Health
Affairs Dr. Thomas Moxley III, and Department of Agricul-
ture Secretary John Block. The "Petition to Alleviate
Domestic Infant Formula Misuse and Provide Informed
Feeding Choice" was filed by Lois Salesbury and Angela
Glover Blackwell, attorneys for the Petitioners, on June 17,
1981. The various federal agencies named as respondents
have acknowledge receipt but haire not yet made any deci-
"They are trying to create a need
from which they will profit, with
little regard for the added price'
consumers pay in infant disease
and mortality."
sions regarding the procedures they will follow for its con-
sideration.
The 144-page petition contains some startling facts.
Domestically, the medical/hospital channels are nearly the
exclusive focus of promotion efforts. The formula manufac-
turers can rely on health care professionals who have been
well informed by sales personnel (called "detailmen") to
suggest the use of formula to their maternity and obstetric
patients. The suggestion that breastfeeding is sometimes
"not enough" or "less convenient" is extremely powerful
when uttered by a physician.
American doctors learn very little about nutrition dur-
ing their medical training. The manufacturers take advan-
tage of this void by providing lecturers, seminars, and con-
ferences on infant health and nutrition. They offer to subsi
dize the costs and to pay the expenses of many physicians
whom they think would benefit from the educational ex-
perience. The conflict of interest is obvious. Even more
striking, though, is the conflict of interest within the profes-
sional medical organizations.
Ross Laboratories, for example, provides the American
Academy of Pediatrics with a one million dollar two-year
renewable grant to publish educational materials including
Pediatrics in Review.
This much-needed financial support ties these organi-
zations to the companies and inhibits their functions.
For example, one pediatric nurse practitioner did a
television show on breastfeeding. Afterwards she re-
ceived a call from the President of the California
Association of Pediatric Nurses and Practitioners
(CAPNAP) who reported that
"The regional sales manager of Ross had been
upset about the program and had said to her that he
thought Ross would have 'difficulty funding CAP-
NAP in the future if one of their nurse practitioners
ever did something like that again.. . .' It would real-
ly be hard on CAPNAP if they had to do without all
the support and services they get from Ross."
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The claims made by the detailmen and often transmit-
ted by the physicians are not scientifically inaccurate, but it
is easy to see how they are designed to have the effect of
undermining breastfeeding. The themes that are repeated
include: (1) formula is supported by medical experts; (2) for-
mula is supported by science; (3) formula makes for healthy
babies; (4) formula fights mothers' fears [about whether
their children are eating enough]. (It is worth noting that
there is an extremely small number of women who are not
physiologically capable of nourishing their children perfect-
ly well for several months.)
Public Advocates found that the role of hospitals in
pushing the use of formula was at least as important as that
of each woman's physician. Hospitals are architecturally de-
signed (often with the technical and financial assistance of
the industry) to facilitate formula feeding; babies are in
nurseries away from their mothers and are routinely put on
a four-hour schedule. A child will be brought to its mother
at times other than those chosen by the hospital only if the
mother is adamant in her demands.
Additionally, the discharge packs of free samples given
to all mothers, regardless of their choice of feeding methods,
provides subtle but very effective advertising for formula
makers. The mother views this as the hospital condoning,
recommending, or prescribing at least partial bottle feeding.
Some manufacturers even provide special 'gift packs" for
mothers who have chosen to breastfeed, underscoring the
necessity of formula for even those women.
The goal is to get women "hooked" on what they are
given at the hospital. Sometimes this convinces mothers
that ready-to-use formula (the most expensive type) is the
kind their children need. When the mothers receive little
support for breastfeeding from their physicians, see formula
advertising in doctors' offices, maternity clinics, and deliv-
"ery areas of the hospital, and then receive the gift pack in
the hospital, the temptation to question breastfeeding is
almost irresistible. Breastfeeding is a learned response for
both mother and child. If no one assists and supports a new
mother, she will almost inevitably fail and turn to the
bottle-feeding method.
The costs of growing infant formula use in the United
States is staggering. It is particularly important to bear in
mind that the majority of infant formula users in the United
States are lower-income, less-educated women. According
to a "crude but conservative estimate" of Dr. Allan Cun-
ningham (based on 1979 births) about five thousand U.S.
infants could be saved yearly if every woman breastfed.
The Public Advocates note that:
fed babies translates directly into greater expense for
hospitalization, out-patient care, and emergency room
services. Additionally, the greater expense of formula
as opposed to breastmilk must be added to the costly
lifetime effects of bottle feeding, including greater
tendencies to obesity, more allergies, dental caries,
psychological problems from the absence of bonding.
Finally there is the significant role that bottle feeding
plays in the infant mortality rate in the United
States, a rate much higher than many other industri,
alized countries and nearly three times greater (4.6/
1000) than the rate in the 1930s for welfare infants in
the United States who were breastfed (1.4/1000).
Some of these expensive consequences for the [an,









Total Estimated Savings $378,592,000.00
Also noteworthy is the fact that WIC (welfare food
program for women, infants, and children) is the largest
single purchaser and distributor of infant formula in the
world. The government picks up the tab for children in this
program to be formula fed for up to two years, at the full
market price.
National surveys found that substantial numbers of
low-income mothers, presented with accurate information,
will, like their middle- and upper-income counterparts,
choose what is best for their infant's health and well being:
breastfeeding. Contrary to the common presumption, the
cause of the increase in bottle feeding among low-income
women is not work but rather misinformation.
The strategy for remedying the commerciogenic malnu-
trition problem in the United States is an information cam-
paign. The Public Advocates are attempting to place the
burden of countering formula overpromotion upon govern,
ment agencies, with the hope that the persuasive scientific
data they have so eloquently presented will be compelling.
The facts, figures, and information discussed in the
Petition demonstrate that any delay in remedying the
current situation is costly not only in terms of human
suffering caused by unnecessary illness, but in the
ever-increasing burden of expenditure borne by tax
payers for easily preventable hospital visits and medi
cal treatment. These are expenditures which can be
averted if the federal government uses its power and
The greater morbidity and mortality rates for bottle-
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